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ABSTRAK
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) merupakan salah satu cabang dari organisasi internasional, Hizbut Tahrir. 
HTI menyebarkan agendanya dengan menekankan pada kewajiban bagi Muslim untuk menciptakan kembali 
kekhalifahan Islam mengingat HTI meyakini bahwa hal itu merupakan jalan utama untuk mengagungkan Islam 
sebagai kekuatan dominan. Studi ini berargumen bahwa keinginan HTI untuk menciptakan kembali kekhalifahan 
Islam bertentangan dengan ide negara kebangsaan di Indonesia. Dasar kerangka teori studi ini adalah bagian dari 
dimensi ‘politik-agama’ dalam hubungan antarbangsa. Studi ini menggunakan analisis historis untuk memahami 
perdebatan antara ide sistem khalifah dan negara bangsa dengan menganalisis ide HTI mengenai pembentukan 
kembali khilafah Islam. Analisis menunjukkan bahwa ketegangan antara HTI dengan elemen lain dalam masyarakat 
Indonesia berkaitan dengan pengaturan negara melambangkan kompetisi yang berkelanjutan antara kelompok 
Islamis dan nasionalis.
Kata Kunci: Khilafah Islam, negara bangsa, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia
 ABSTRACT 
The Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) is a branch of international Islamic organization, Hizbut Tahrir. HTI pro-
pagates its agenda by emphasizing that it is an obligation for Muslims to restore the Islamic caliphate since HTI 
believes that it is the ultimate way to glorify Islam as a dominant power. This study will argue that HTI’s desire to 
restore the Islamic caliphate conflicts with the idea of nation state in Indonesia. The basic theoretical framework 
in this study is part of the ‘politico-religious’ dimension of world affairs. This study undertakes the historical 
analysis to understand the debate between the idea of Islamic caliphate and the idea of nation state by analyzing 
HTI’s idea to restore the Islamic caliphate. The analysis shows that the tension between HTI and other elements 
of Indonesian society regarding how the state should be ordered symbolizes the continuing competition between 
Islamists and nationalists.
Keywords: Islamic caliphate, nation state, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia
1 This article was developed from a position paper published by Center for Political Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences, 
2008.
BACKGROUND
The Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), literally means 
“the Liberation Party of Indonesia”, is one of the 
Islamic groups in Indonesia which consistently 
strive to restore the Islamic caliphate. Although 
HTI attempts to bring about a fundamental change 
to the Indonesian political structure, it refuses 
to participate in national elections. Unlike other 
fundamentalist groups, HTI does not have militia 
units and rejects the use of force to achieve its 
goals. It prefers to use peaceful means to address 
Islamic issues by organizing rallies and demon-
strations (Fealy, 2004, p. 117).
The main goal of HTI is to restore the Islamic 
caliphate in order to reshape the Muslim society 
and state. HTI argues that it is Muslims’ obliga-
tion to establish an Islamic caliphate which is 
not based solely on historical realities, but is also 
commanded by God and the Prophet Muhammad 
as a holy way to apply Islamic law and to unite 
Muslims worldwide. It believes that Muslims are 
currently dominated politically, economically, 
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socially, and culturally by non-believers. The 
best way to liberate Muslims from subjugation 
is to establish an Islamic caliphate (Fealy, 2004, 
p. 116; Ahnaf, 2006). For HTI, restoring an Islamic 
caliphate does not have to return to the last Ottoman 
caliphate. Rather it aims to be similar to the cali-
phate on the path of Prophethood, by taking the 
example of the Prophet Muhammad as continued 
by the caliphs (the rightly-guided caliphate) who 
were the Prophet’s prominent companions. 
Historically, the HTI is a branch of interna-
tional organization, Hizbut Tahrir. It was founded 
in Jerusalem in 1953 by Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, 
a Palestinian religious scholar and judge. Influ-
enced by Muslim Brotherhood (Al Ikhwan Al 
Muslimun)2 thought, Taqiuddin’s perspective lies 
in his disapproval of Western imperialism and his 
determination to reverse its damaging impact on 
Muslim societies through the return to Islamic 
forms (Taji-Farouki, 1996; Fealy, 2004, p. 116). 
The severe realities of the continued suppression 
by the West, the loss of Palestine, and the en-
trenchment of the nation-state with its associated 
secular politics, posed a serious challenge to 
Taqiuddin’s traditional roots (Taji-Farouki, 1996).
Hizbut Tahrir began its activity in Indonesia 
in 1982–83 through the efforts of Abdullah bin 
Nuh, an Indonesian preacher and lecturer, and 
Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi, an Australian-based 
HT teacher and activist. Bin Nuh and Al-Baghdadi 
developed the organization and built a strong 
following among tertiary students and young 
intellectuals in Java and Sumatra (Fealy, 2004, 
p. 116). In attempt to disseminate the party’s 
ideology, HTI held an international conference 
in 2000 and 2007 on the Islamic caliphate issue, 
which highlighted the uneasy relations and views 
between religion and the state in Indonesia. 
Although the HTI uphold a radical ideology, 
they see themself as a peaceful group by employing 
2 Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is an international Islamist 
movement founded by the Sufi schoolteacher Hassan 
al-Banna in 1928 in Egypt. It is the world’s largest and 
most influential political Islamist group. Several linked 
groups have since formed across many nations of the 
Muslim world. MB supporters claim that while Al Qaeda 
is violent, the Brotherhood’s theology and methods is 
“reformist”, “democratic”, “non-violent” and “mainly 
political”. See Taji-Farouki (1996) A Fundamental 
Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic 
Caliphate, London: Grey Seal.
peaceful and systemic mobilization strategies and 
avoiding violence (Hwang, 2009). Regarding its 
goal to establish an Islamic caliphate, HTI is also 
among the Islamic groups which are struggling 
to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. Accor-
ding to HTI’s rationale, an Islamic state should be 
established before applying sharia (Islamic law). 
This point of view differs from other Islamic groups 
which try to apply sharia in Indonesia without 
becoming an Islamic state (Ahnaf, 2006, p. 7). 
Paradoxically, HTI identifies itself as a 
political party, but refuses to participate in the 
Indonesian electoral process or any other aspect 
of the secular system. HTI activists believe that 
sharia, especially those related to the public, such 
as hudud (the law of limitations), jinayat (the 
criminal law), and takzir (the penal law), can be 
administered only by a caliph, and not by indi-
viduals, groups, a president, or a prime minister, 
as in a secular system (Ahnaf, 2006, p. 7). 
HTI believes that applying sharia in a secular 
state is both problematic and meaningless. In 
HTI’s understanding, it looks like constructing 
a mosque on the foundations of a movie theatre 
or nightclub as symbols of decadence. It also 
believes that such a system would lead to com-
promise, which would distort and remove parts 
of Islamic law and place crucial issue areas like 
the economy and politics under a non-Islamic 
system (Ahnaf, 2006, p. 7).
According to HTI’s rationale, Islamic parties’ 
attempts to apply Islamic law in secular states 
have failed in countries that use a democratic sys-
tem (Ahnaf, 2006, p. 8). In the case of Indonesia, 
Islamic parties were defeated by nationalistic par-
ties; in Malaysia, the Islamic Parties of Malaysia 
(PAS) was defeated by the United Malay National 
Organizations (UMNO); in Jordan, the Ikhwan 
Party and Islamic Action party lost; in Egypt, 
Ikhwanul Muslimin, led by Hassan al-Banna, 
failed to place its candidates in parliament in 
1945 (Ahnaf, 2006, p. 8). 
However, mainstream Muslims3 have a dif-
ferent point of view regarding the Islamic state 
discourse. According to them, it is not significant 
to establish an Islamic state in formal ideologi-
3 The majority of Indonesian Muslims, as represented by 
mainstream organizations such as the Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU) and Muhammadiyah, have millions of members.
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cal terms. The important thing is that the state 
guarantees the existence of Islam’s basic values, 
and there is no legitimate basis to put Islam in 
opposition to the secular system (Effendy, 2003, 
p. 7). 
This paper describes the HTI’s desire to 
restore an Islamic caliphate. HTI propagates its 
agenda by emphasizing that it is an obligation 
for Muslims to restore an Islamic caliphate since 
HTI believes that it is the ultimate way to glorify 
Islam as a dominant power. This study will argue 
that HTI’s desire to restore an Islamic caliphate 
conflicts with the idea of nation state in Indone-
sia. Although the popular view in Indonesia sees 
Islam and the secular system as being compatible, 
the HTI sees these as being quite the opposite.
The research method of this paper is textual 
analysis. It analyses the existing literature which 
consists of published literature such as books, 
journals, newspapers, and information from 
websites related to HTI. The basic theoretical 
framework in this study is part of the ‘politico-
religious’ dimension of world affairs. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In the last generations, religion has become one 
of the most influential factors in world affairs. 
However, it remains as one of the least examined 
factors in the study and practice of world affairs 
(Ersoy, 2012, p. 88). In International Relations 
discipline, religion is often being connected with 
conflict and violence. In line with this argument, 
Jonathan Fox (Fox, 2004, p. 716) states that: 
“For most of the 20th century, the dominant para-
digm in the social sciences on this topic was that 
religion would have no role in modern society and 
politics. The political science version of this para-
digm, modernization theory, posits that processes 
inherent in modernization should inevitably lead 
to the demise of primordial factors like ethnicity 
and religion in politics. These processes include 
urbanization, economic development, modern 
social institutions, growing rates of literacy and 
education, pluralism, and advancements in sci-
ence and technology. While this literature tends to 
focus on ethnicity, it is also clearly meant to apply 
to religion. In contrast, secularization theory, the 
sociological analogue of modernization theory, 
does focus on religion. It posits that the same 
factors cited by modernization theory will lead 
to the demise of religion, which is to be replaced 
by secular, rational, and scientific phenomena.”
However, after the end of the Cold War, 
religious actors, practices, and institutions have 
been able to be seen in international relations’ 
practice. They have become more visible after 
9/11 where relevancy of religion was increased in 
international affair’s practice. Scholars belief that 
there was a return and a resurgence of religion 
from the exile on the margins of rational politics 
(Fitzgerald, 2011, p. 28). Despite majority of stud-
ies examine the relationship between violence and 
religion, especially Islam, there are some studies 
which discuss the place and role of religion in 
international relations. One of them is Pavlos 
Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito’s book Religion 
and International Relations: The Return from 
Exile, who argue that “the rejection of religion 
seems to be inscribed in the genetic code of the 
discipline of IR”, contend that “having unexpect-
edly survived the long Westphalian exile, religion 
is back to the center of international relations” 
(Ersoy, 2012, p. 82).
In the context of Islam, the idea of restoring 
Islamic caliphate have become the agenda of 
the Islamists. The caliphate is an Islamic form 
of government representing the political unity 
and leadership of the Muslim world. The idea 
of restoring Islamic caliphate can be analysed in 
the context of world affairs since it challenged 
the secular system of nation states. After 9/11, 
in his first speech, Osama bin Laden criticised 
injustices amongst Muslim which have become 
a justification for terrorist acts against the West 
and accused the European role for ousting the 
last Ottoman caliph in the nineteenth century 
(Kazimi, 2008, p. 1). However, most of Islamists 
are more focused on restoring earlier caliphates 
in the era of the four rightly Guided Caliphs 
who ruled after Prophet Muhammad’s death in 
the seventh century or the Abbasid caliphate 
that established from the ninth to the thirteenth 
centuries and abolished by the Mongols. Some 
Western and Islamic thinkers have made up a nar-
rative of the caliphate as a lasting institution and 
central to Islam and Islamic thought. However, in 
reality, the caliphate is a political or religious idea 
with little relevance to contemporary condition 
(Danforth, 2014).
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POLITICAL SETTING
The downfall of the Soeharto regime in May 
1998 led to the disassembling of the repressive 
structures imposed by the New Order and can be 
seen as a major breakthrough for the democratic 
process (Effendy, 2003). Restrictions on politi-
cal parties, the media, freedom of speech and 
association were lifted and democratic elections 
were held (Fealy, 2004, p. 104). These features 
of democracy were not seen in the Soeharto era. 
Election rallying alone could have resulted in jail 
for the leader of political groups. This major de-
velopment had singular significance for Muslims 
as they now had, after four decades of repression, 
the freedom to express their political aspirations 
(Trotter, 2006, p. 1). The development of Islamic 
parties was not only encouraged but a number of 
radical Islamic organizations rose in the public 
sphere to vie for popular support (Effendy, 2003). 
These organizations expressed their political 
aspirations in a strong and militant way. 
The resurgence of Islamic militant groups 
showed that previously repressed groups were 
now able to organize freely. In contemporary 
Indonesia, the most prominent of these groups 
include: Front Pembela Islam (FPI, or the Islamic 
Defenders’ Front); Forum Komunikasi Ahlus 
Sunnah Wal Jamaah (FKAWJ, or the Communi-
cation Forum for the Adherents of the Prophetic 
Tradition and the Community) along with its 
militia wing Laskar Jihad (the Warrior of Jihad); 
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, the Indo-
nesian Islamic Warrior’s Council) along with its 
Laskar Mujahidin (the Mujahidin Brigade), and 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (the Liberation Party of 
Indonesia) (Effendy, 2003, p. 218). 
Some analysts (Effendy, 2003, p. 217) view 
the existence of these organizations as an affirma-
tion of the resurgence of Islamic militant groups 
in post-New Order Indonesia. The blunt attitude 
and militant overtones of these organizations in 
articulating Islam signal the spread of Islamic 
militancy and a challenge to the legitimacy of 
the secular system adopted by Indonesian state-
makers. According to analysts, all of these groups 
seek a dramatic change within Indonesian society 
and politics (Effendy, 2003, p. 217). They all 
share the same concern that the state and the 
greater Muslim society should undertake sharia 
law more seriously. Specifically, their concerns 
include the implementation of sharia law, the 
establishment of an Islamic state and ultimately 
an Islamic caliphate (Fealy, 2004, p. 106). They 
perceive the existence of the secular system in 
Indonesia as the prolongation of the Western 
hegemony responsible for the on-going politico-
economic crisis (Hassan, 2006, p. 217). Instead 
of the secular system, they propose the sharia 
as an alternative basis for the state and strongly 
emphasize its superiority over any other system 
(Hassan, 2006, p. 217). 
In doing so, they attempt to bring Islam to 
the center of the national political discourse. They 
demonstrate a strong desire to replace the existing 
system and to establish Islam as a comprehensive 
system covering political, social, economic, and 
cultural affairs. They also have the same agenda 
with regard to challenging Western domination 
and influence, especially that of the US (Umam, 
2006, p. 8). Although these groups share similar 
concerns in these respects, they differ in their 
advocacy of their concerns. Though they utilize 
connected networks, each of them is a separate 
organization (Umam, 2006, p. 8). The advent of 
a globalized world has also encouraged many 
analysts to connect these new developments 
in Indonesia to the worldwide trend of Islamic 
fundamentalism (Effendy, 2003, p. 217). Some of 
the groups, for example, have connections with 
the international Islamic movement, while others 
might only share ideas and thoughts (Effendy, 
2003, p. 217). 
In a national context, Fealy (2004) argues that 
the resurgence of Islamic militant groups is a 
response to the transition to a post-New Order 
democracy. However, Effendy (2003, p. 218) 
argues that the development of militant groups is 
merely a reaction to socio-religious and political 
circumstances which developed during the transi-
tion period. In this regard, it is important to note 
that both the national and international context 
have triggered the resurgence of these groups. In 
the national context, the incapacity of the state to 
run effectively and to solve the urgent problems 
concerning the lives of Muslims, has led to 
socio-religious conflicts in several provinces in 
Indonesia-notably West and Central Kalimanta n, 
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Eastern Nusa Tenggara, the Moluccas, and Cen-
tral Sulawesi. The lack of law enforcement with 
regard to gambling and prostitution, or the regula-
tion of alcoholic beverages has caused dissatis-
faction among Indonesian Muslims, which has 
led to the emergence of militant groups (Effendy, 
2003, p. 218; Hassan, 2006, p. 13). Likewise, in 
the international context, the US foreign policy 
towards the Islamic world is frequently perceived 
as discriminatory and unjust, especially concern-
ing Palestine, Afghanistan, and Iraq. These factors 
have contributed much to the resurgence of the 
Islamic militant groups (Effendy, 2003, p. 218).
THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIZBUT 
TAHRIR INDONESIA
This section looks primarily at the perspective of 
the group which believes a caliphate would be 
better than nation-state by analysing the develop-
ment of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) as a case 
study. This section analyses further the history 
of HTI, therefore, the development of its radical 
agenda, the way this is at odds with the current 
conception of a nation-state and how in the 
future, it may lead to tension with the state. The 
HTI has not yet received any significant attention 
from scholars, despite having existed for some 
decades before the downfall of Soeharto regime. 
Although HTI has been accused of radicalizing 
young people compared to other groups (Peter, 
2007), HTI is unique in that it uses peaceful 
means to promote the radical idea of restoring 
the Islamic caliphate. HTI is also unique in that 
although it claims to be a political party, it refuses 
to participate in national elections (Fealy, 2004, 
p. 117). Compared to other Indonesian organi-
zations, HTI is the only organization which is 
directed by foreign leadership. It draws its strict 
ideology from its central organization (HT) and 
it has a global agenda (Fealy, 2007, p. 152). 
In order to understand the development of 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), we need to under-
stand the history and ideology of HTI’s central 
organization, Hizbut Tahrir al-Islami (HT). Hiz-
but Tahrir al-Islami (the Islamic Liberation Party) 
was founded in Jerusalem in 1953 by Taqiuddin 
al-Nabhani, a Palestinian religious scholar and 
judge, to establish an Islamic state and to liberate 
Palestine. According to Commins (1991, p. 194), 
the party broadened its primary concern with 
Palestine to the goal of building up an Islamic 
state that would restore an Islamic caliphate as 
the ultimate Islamic order throughout the Muslim 
world. In this regard, the liberation of Palestine 
would result from the unification and strengthen-
ing of the umma (Islamic community) through a 
unitary Islamic state. The party then spread from 
its original base on the Jordanian-ruled West 
bank to Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Central Asia, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Although 
the party spread widely, it did not have much 
support, even over the last twenty years when 
Islamist groups have enjoyed growing influence. 
Through the writings of its founder and chief 
ideologue, Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, however, the 
party has outlined a blue print for reviving the 
Islamic caliphate (Commins, 1991, p. 194).
Al-Nabhani’s teaching emphasizes three 
main themes: to persuade Muslims that Islam 
is preferable to capitalism and socialism/com-
munism as the basis for a modern political, eco-
nomic, and social order; to analyze Muslims’ own 
history in order to identify the causes of their con-
temporary political weakness; and to emphasize 
that Muslims should strive to restore an Islamic 
state (Commins, 1991, p. 197). Al-Nabhani made 
comparisons among three ideologies in terms of 
human order. According to Al-Nabhani, capital-
ism puts responsibility for establishing social 
order in the hand of individuals by separating 
religion from daily life. Communism views social 
order as being based on the means of production. 
Islam argues that God created order for humanity 
and communicated this through the prophets. To 
implement its order, communism dictates that the 
state should use the army and the law. Capitalism 
dictates that the state guard individual freedoms. 
An Islamic order would guarantee the individual 
believer’s faith in the justice and social order, 
and cooperation between the nation and the state 
(Commins, 1991, p. 198). 
In its discussion of Islam and democracy, HT 
insists that the two are incompatible due to the 
fundamental issue of sovereignty. HT believes 
that “governance is a function in which humans 
are subordinate to the primacy of God” (Baran, 
2004, p. 18), therefore, it rejects all forms of 
governance that it sees man-made and therefore 
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imperfect, like democracy, which it sees as a 
system of the kufr or disbelievers (Al-Nabhani, 
1999). In a democracy, sovereignty and authority 
are held by the people, while in Islam, the ultimate 
sovereignty is held by God, with authority at best 
temporally vested in the people. Based on this 
huge contrast, HT argues that it is not appropri-
ate to conceptualize Islam within a democratic 
framework (Baran, 2004, p. 18). 
Because of the incompatibility it perceives 
between Islam and democracy, HT believes that 
“we are already in an ideological clash between 
the secular democratic ideology and the God-
given system.” (Baran, 1999, p. 18). According 
to HT’s rationale, civilizations are built on 
ideas, and the intellectual is the main realm of 
conflict. In order to win this conflict, HT strives 
to promote its agenda as a way to compete with 
Western democracy. HT believes that “the new 
world order” they will help create will be “with 
the participation of the people, [and] the values of 
the people … the resources will be for the people 
and not used by corrupt rulers that are installed 
by the West and the multinationals …” (Baran, 
1999, p. 18). Arguing that the Western system is 
“corrupt” and that the US is losing the hearts and 
minds of Muslims, HT is increasingly convinced 
that the majority of the world’s Muslims will 
ultimately choose its proposal of the system of 
God (Baran, 1999, p. 18). 
“It is now clear for all to see, especially the 
Muslims who work to restore the rule of Islam 
and bring life to their ideology, that Western 
‘Civilization’ is dead. Dead and buried. The West 
has failed to convince the Muslims of their ideol-
ogy, Capitalism. They have failed to convince us 
of Secularism. The hypocrisy of democracy has 
become transparent. The charade of international 
law and the UN has been exposed. The entire 
Muslim World today calls for a change, and 
this change is no longer inspired by the western 
people or the western ideology, but in spite of it”.4
Al-Nabhani asserts that the destruction and 
the abolition of the last caliphate of the Ottoman 
by Mustafa Kamal was the most disastrous event 
4 See also “The Khilafah Has Been Established”, Khilafah 
Magazine, April 2003, p. 4.
in Muslim’s history (Commins, 1991, p. 200)5. He 
argues that this was the root cause of the current 
political weakness of the global Muslim com-
munity. He also argues that since the destruction 
of the last caliphate, imperialism has effectively 
distorted Muslim culture and that most Muslims 
have ignored the importance of establishing an 
Islamic state in order to implement Islamic law. 
Indeed, it is difficult for Muslims to imagine an 
Islamic order due to the influence of Western 
ideas. Through cultural imperialism, Muslims are 
informed that they never had a state and that reli-
gion must be separated from the state. Although 
Muslims may be aware of the dangers of cultural 
imperialism, they are coopted by the ideas which 
are spread by imperialism to eradicate Islam as a 
cultural and political force. Therefore, according 
to Al-Nabhani, the basis of Muslims’ political 
struggle is to fight imperialism in all its forms 
(Commins, 1991, p. 201). 
Al-Nabhani insists that Islam must be intro-
duced directly into the global arena: “If there is 
no nation or people who embrace a basic idea, 
live according to it and convey it world-wide, 
there can be no hope for the world’s welfare or 
salvation” (Taji-Farouki, 1996, p. 43). Al-Nabhani 
urges Muslims to take responsibility to save the 
world by establishing an Islamic state that will 
spread Islamic doctrine globally. Comparing the 
history of Islamic doctrine with that of capitalism, 
he emphasizes that “for tens of generations and 
for over a thousand years hundreds of thousands 
enjoyed stability and dignity, and flourished under 
the shelter of this idea” (Taji-Farouki, 1996, p. 
44).
While the aspiration to revive the caliphate 
is not popular among Islamic groups at this time, 
Hizbut Tahrir is the first Islamic group to posit 
this idea as its ultimate goal. For Al-Nabhani, 
5 European incitement of the prewar Arab and Turkish 
nationalist movements and the Arab Revolt paved the 
way for the empire’s demise. After the war, the oc-
cupying allied forces agreed to evacuate Anatolia and 
Istanbul in return for Mustafa Kamal’s promise to abolish 
the caliphate. On 3 March 1924, the last caliph, Sultan 
Abdul Hamid II, had been removed by Mustafa Kamal 
Attaturk’s secular Turkish government. See David Com-
mins, “Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani and the Islamic Liberation 
Party”, the Muslim World, Vol. lXXXI, No. 1–2, 1991, 
p. 200. 
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the concept of the caliphate is based on powerful 
doctrinal and practical assumptions. According 
to Al-Nabhani, Muslims are obliged to establish 
and uphold the caliphate system. The companions 
of the Prophet (al-khulafa’ al-rashidun) imple-
mented this system during the first generations 
of Islam and it is seen as the only system that 
can propagate God’s words. For Al-Nabhani, the 
caliphate is not only spiritual leadership for the 
umma, but also a global Islamic government with 
the authority to correct the affairs of the global 
Muslim community (Fealy, 2007, p. 154). 
THE HISTORY OF HIZBUT TAHRIR 
INDONESIA
Hizbut Tahrir initially appeared in Indonesia 
between 1982–1983, twenty nine years after Al-
Nabhani established HT in Jordan. It appeared 
through the efforts of two prominent figures, 
Mama Abdullah bin Nuh and Abdurrahman al-
Baghdadi (Arifin, 2005, p. 122; Fealy, 2007, p. 
155). Abdullah bin Nuh was a lecturer at one 
of Indonesia’s leading tertiary institutions, the 
Bogor Agricultural Institute (Institut Pertanian 
Bogor/IPB), and a preacher at pesantren (Islamic 
boarding school) Al-Ghazali in Bogor, West Java. 
Abdullah bin Nuh was disillusioned with the 
existing Islamic movements in Indonesia during 
the late 1970s and believed that they had failed 
to address the problems facing the Muslim com-
munity (Arifin, 2005, p. 122). In his search for an 
alternative form of Islamic thinking and activism, 
one which would incorporate both religion and 
politics, bin Nuh became attracted to the work of 
HT. He believed that HT was superior in terms of 
ideology compared to other Islamic movements 
of the time. During his visits to Sydney, he be-
came familiar with HT’s teachings and also came 
to know HT’s activists based in Australia (Fealy, 
2007, p. 155). Later on, he invited a charismatic 
young activist, Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi, to 
visit Indonesia to disseminate HT’s teachings. 
Al-Baghdadi was a Lebanese national who had 
joined the Palestinian armed struggle against 
Israel and according to some accounts had been 
captured and tortured by Israeli soldiers (Fealy, 
2007, p. 155). 
Al-Baghdadi used bin Nuh’s pesantren as 
his base and started to preach to campus Muslim 
groups, particularly in the larger state tertiary 
institutions such as the Bogor Agricultural Insti-
tute (Institut Pertanian Bogor/IPB), the Bandung 
Institute of Technology (Institut Teknologi Ban-
dung/ITB), the University of Indonesia, Gadjah 
Mada University, Airlangga University as well 
as at mosques across Java. In order to increase 
the number of followers, Al-Baghdadi and bin 
Nuh conducted halaqah (study circles) and 
dauroh (training programs) as the main ways to 
disseminate HT’s teachings. In these early stages, 
they did not bear the name Hizbut Tahrir in order 
to avoid attention from Indonesia’s intelligence 
services. During the Soeharto era, these services 
took a harsh stance towards such groups. As a 
result, they were active under Lembaga Dakwah 
Kampus (Campus Dakwah Organization, LDK) 
name or as a foundation. For instance, in Bogor, 
the name they used is Yayasan Kemudi or The 
Association of Former LDK activists. Ismail 
Yusanto, one of the founding members of Hizbut 
Tahrir in Indonesia, explain that:
“For the first ten years, we focused on gathering 
followers on [college] campuses. We then entered 
other centers of gathering—offices, mosques, 
pesantren, and also senior high schools. How? 
Through basic training. We have special training 
on four main topics—Islam, personality, sharia, 
etc ... we were recruiting and gathering ... from 
campuses and other avenues” (Hwang, 2009: 57).
The downfall of the Soeharto regime in 1998 
was a blessing in disguise for the development of 
HTI. This political event motivated HTI to bring 
its existence into the public view. At present, HTI 
claims tens of thousands of members and has 
a strong presence on the campus of the Bogor 
Agricultural Institute (Institut Pertanian Bogor/
IPB); in Yogyakarta, in Central Java; in Jakarta; 
and in Makassar, in South Sulawesi (Arifin, 2005, 
p. 122). It also publishes a host of publications 
including a monthly bulletin, al-Wa’ie (ICG 
Report, 2003, p. 12). 
Although HTI’s membership is a small per-
cen tage compared to mainstream Muslim orga-
nizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU) which have millions of members, 
this does not prevent HTI from spreading its 
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ideology amongst the Indonesian Muslims com-
munity. (Arifin, 2005, p. 122). Unlike many other 
Islamic groups, HTI is seemingly less interested 
in a broad mass following and has instead opted 
for a smaller, more committed group of members 
coming predominantly from Indonesia’s educated 
middle classes (BBC News, 12 August 2007). 
This small membership has helped HTI to con-
duct a number of political activities (Arifin, 2005, 
p. 122). For example, HTI has actively appeared 
in several public rallies, successfully mobilizing 
thousands of demonstrators in support of the 
implementation of sharia in 2002 and against the 
US war with Iraq in 2003 (ICG Report, 2007, 
p. 12). In early 2000 and 2007, HTI held an 
international conference on the Islamic caliphate 
issue, both of which attracted significant media 
coverage6. 
HTI has appeared publicly, while its leader-
ship remains unclear. The only formal informa-
tion is that Ismail Yusanto is HTI’s spokesperson 
(Umam, 2006, p. 11). As Umam notes (2006, p. 
11), the secrecy over HTI’s leadership is influ-
enced by the bitter experience of HT leaders in 
Arab countries where they have been repressed, 
tortured, and jailed. One thing that is clear is that 
HTI has a strict policy of subordination to the 
central Hizbut Tahrir leadership (Fealy, 2007, p. 
158). The central HT board, based in Jordan, pre-
sumably keeps a close watch over HTI activities. 
At least once a year, the chief of the HT central 
board sends delegates to Indonesia to consolidate 
HT’s activities with local leaders and to guarantee 
that the central doctrinal views and policies are 
in accordance with those of locals (Fealy, 2007, 
p. 158). 
Despite accusations that HTI may have 
con nections with other fundamentalist groups, 
such as Jamaah Islamiyah which is alleged to 
be responsible for the Bali bombing in October 
2002, since its public appearance in 1998, HTI 
has never been involved in violent activities. What 
started as an underground campus movement 
today remains largely campus based, participat-
ing in public rallies and meetings where there 
are no government restrictions (Baran, 2004, p. 
6 The media reported that more than 80,000 Muslims 
gathered at the 2007 conference, http://www.csmonitor.
com/2007/0813/p99s01-duts.htm.
42–43). The Indonesian government does watch 
over its activities. For instance, the government 
prevented some of HT’s internationally-based 
members from entering the country and speaking 
at the International Caliphate Conference 2007 in 
Jakarta, including Imran Waheed (Hizbut Tahrir 
Britain) and Sheikh Ismail al-Wahwah (Hizbut 
Tahrir Australia) (BBC News, 13 August 2007)7. 
HTI’S GOAL OF RESTORING  
CALIPHATE
Another feature that distinguishes HTI from other 
Islamic groups is its high level loyalty to the cen-
tral leadership’s ideology (Fealy, 2007, p. 158). 
All HT branches across the world have the same 
ideology, rooted in the thinking of its founder, 
Taqiuddin al-Nabhani. They believe that the only 
way to ensure that Muslims live in a just, pious 
and secure society is by creating a transnational 
Islamic state headed by caliph. This means that 
Muslims should not be divided into many states 
but should be under one global Islamic state 
or caliphate. Therefore, HTI rejects the idea of 
nationalism and the nation-state. They see these 
constructions as weakening and destroying the 
unity of Muslims all over the world (Umam, 
2006, p. 11). 
As Umam (2006, p. 11) points out, the objec-
tive of restoring an Islamic caliphate is also a re-
sponse to the domination of the Western powers. 
According to HTI, the influence and control of the 
West, and especially the US, over Muslim coun-
tries is unacceptable. In the view of this group, 
when the US unilaterally invaded Afghanistan 
and Iraq, there was no single Muslim country that 
challenged it in a significant way, thus proving 
the weak position of Muslim countries vis-à-vis 
the West. According to HTI, the only way to 
confront Western domination is to establish an 
Islamic caliphate that will strengthen and unify 
the power of Muslims (Umam, 2006, p. 11). Ac-
cording to Abdullah Robin, a London-based HT 
leader, HT is “the only political party wanting 
to unite the umma”, as opposed to merely unit-
ing Muslims in single nation-states-a political 
7  See also “Massive Hizb ut-Tahrir Caliphate Conference 
Opens in Jakarta- 100,000 Expected”, 11 August 2007, 
http://gatewaypundit.blogspot.com/2007/08/massive-
hizb-ut-tahrir-caliphate.html.
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unit that HT believes to be “anathema to Islam” 
(Baran, 2004, p. 17). Therefore, HT faces the 
challenge of uniting the large number of diverse 
Muslim groups with different interpretations of 
Islam. (Baran, 2004, p. 17).
Drawing on al-Nabhani’s thinking, HT sets 
out a three-stages program for creating an Islamic 
caliphate. The first stage is known as “culturing” 
(tatsqif), and is focused on the cultivation and 
recruitment of prospective members into HT 
(Fealy, 2007, p. 159). In this stage, HT’s ideolo g y 
of Islam is taught to several individuals, who 
unite in thought and feeling to form a cell. This 
“produce[s] people who believe in the idea and 
the method of the Party, so that they form the 
Party group” (Baran, 2004, p. 20). The second 
stage is “interaction” (tafa’ul) with the Muslim 
community, “to let the umma embrace and carry 
Islam, so that the umma takes it up as its issue 
and thus works to establish it in the affairs of life” 
(Baran, 2004, p. 21). In this stage, the party seeks 
an “intellectual transformation” through political 
and cultural interaction to encourage the umma 
to work towards HT’s revolution.
The final stage, “seeking power” (istilamu 
al hukm), involves gaining control of govern-
ment and “totally implementing Islam” across 
the world or in other words, revolution (Fealy, 
2007, p. 159). According to Baran (2004, p. 22), 
this stage is accomplished once the umma has 
embraced HT’s interpretation of Islam as an 
intellectual philosophy, a mode of behavior, and 
a political issue. HTI’s intention is to take power, 
while their stated preference is to conduct non-
violent political revolution through the infiltration 
of government institutions and the recruitment of 
key figures who would join the party and align 
governments with the ideals of HT (Baran, 2004, 
p. 21). According to Fealy (2007, p. 159), this is 
“outside assistance” (nusrah) used to gain power 
which is used by HT to accelerate the accomplish-
ment of the third stage. In the Indonesian context, 
the period from the 1980s to 2000 illustrates 
HTI’s culturing phase. Recently, however, HTI 
entered the second phase, interacting with the 
Indonesian Muslim community in order to more 
widely promote its ideas (Fealy, 2007, p. 159).
CALIPHATE VIS-À-VIS NATION-
STATE IN INDONESIAN CONTEXT
The Islamic revival has gained significant mo-
mentum in the Muslim world but at the same time, 
there are indications that many secular nation-
states in the Muslim world have not been able to 
fulfill their promises to their people (Azra, 2004, 
p. 135). The credibility of secular regimes has 
been eroded and creating skepticism about their 
capability (Azra, 2004, p. 135). This is evident in 
the attempts carried out by the HTI to replace the 
secular regime and nation-state of Indonesia. By 
emphasizing that the continuing crises in Indone-
sia are multidimensional, HTI seeks to show that 
these crises are the consequence of the secular 
system and that these problems will be corrected 
only once a caliphate has been restored. This has 
become the justification for HTI to call for radical 
change in Indonesia, instead of calling for partial 
solutions which fail to grasp the root cause of the 
problem (Fealy, 2007, p. 162).
At every opportunity, HTI emphasises two 
main themes: firstly, the decline of Islam and 
the constant domination of the West; secondly, 
the restoration of the caliphate as the destiny 
of all Muslims. For example, in its publication, 
al-Wa’ie, HTI emphasizes the suffering and bitter 
experiences of Muslims due to Western domina-
tion:
“Now, after more than 80 years without a cali-
phate, the suffering of the Islamic community 
is worsening. Islamic states are split into tens 
of countries which are controlled by Western 
occupiers. Imagine, they (Islamic nations) can’t 
save Palestine which is occupied by tiny Israel 
or Iraqi citizens who are being butchered. The 
blood of Muslims is so easily spilt by US occupi-
ers and their allies, who are helped by traitorous 
agents from the Islamic community itself. Even 
though the Islamic community has more than 1.5 
billion people, poverty, ignorance and conflict are 
synonymous with Islamic states. This is the result 
of secularization. This is the result of the collapse 
of the Islamic Caliphate (Fealy, 2007, p. 162).”
On the issue of the urgent need to restore the 
caliphate, the chairman of HTI’s Central Leader-
ship Board, Hafidz Abdurrahman, highlights that 
“every Muslim is obliged to take up the cause 
towards the implementation of sharia” (Hassan, 
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2006, p. 5). HTI’s spokesperson, Muhammad 
Ismail Yusanto, asserts that the existing secular 
system failed from the beginning since it neglect-
ed the role of religion in the Indonesian public 
sphere and regarded religion as an individual 
matter (Hassan, 2006, p. 5). At public rallies, HTI 
upholds the slogan “Save Indonesia with sharia”. 
HTI believes that Indonesia’s dependence on 
Western countries will be eliminated through the 
implementation of sharia. Yusanto emphasizes 
that sharia can be applied to all humankind since 
it is pertinent to solving problems confronted by 
all peoples regardless of their ethnicity or reli-
gion. In this sense sharia is regarded as universal, 
being based on the universality of Islam (Hassan, 
2006, p. 5).
Muhammad al-Khaththath, HTI’s leader, 
argues similarly that despite the dominant power 
of secular ideologies, including nationalism, 
socialism, and capitalism, there has been a gene-
ral failure to combine both material and spiritual 
dimensions of human experience in a holistic ac-
count of humankind. Al-Khaththath emphasizes 
the importance of sharia to fulfil the spiritual 
potential of humankind and as a means to acceler-
ate the establishment of the caliphate system. For 
al-Khaththath, sharia is the only system that can 
bring Indonesia out of its current crises and can 
achieve prosperity, wealth, and justice (Hassan, 
2006, p. 5).
Due to its rejection of the secular system, 
HTI prefers to struggle outside the parliamentary 
system. It refuses, therefore, to take part in parlia-
mentary democracy and the electoral processes in 
Indonesia. Indeed, the secular system would not 
allow the implementation of sharia. Therefore, 
HTI prefers to struggle for its goal through the 
umma instead of the secular system. Although 
other Islamic groups have been struggling for the 
implementation of sharia through the parliamen-
tary system, HTI argues that this struggle is limited 
and has not achieved significant results (Al-Jawi, 
2006). History has shown that such a struggle has 
led to failure, such as in Algeria through the FIS 
(Front Islamique du Salut) in 1991–1992, as well 
as in Turkey through the Refah Party (Welfare 
Party) in 19958. It is impossible, therefore, to 
8 In 1991, FIS won a majority of the seats in the Algerian 
parliamentary elections. After the army took over control 
achieve such a goal through democracy. HTI also 
refuses to promote the principle of pluralism in 
democracy, since pluralism treats all religions 
equally. It leads to the repudiation of sharia as a 
state’s constitution. HTI claims that democracy 
can be seen as a justification for the international 
conspiracy to manipulate Muslims and to deter 
them from achieving their sacred destiny to live 
under the caliphate and the sharia system (Has-
san, 2006, p. 19).
HTI also criticizes the view that shura (Islamic 
consultation) is equal to democracy. According to 
HTI, shura is part of sharia. It accordingly puts 
sovereignty in the hands of God. In contrast to 
democracy, and particularly with regard to the 
decision making process, shura not only involves 
people voices, but also several steps of careful 
consideration. Accordingly, in the legislation 
process (al-tashri’), decisions cannot be based 
on the majority or minority principle, but rather 
on legal texts, the Quran, and the Sunna, since 
God is the lawgiver, not the people. HTI suggests 
that the function of the ruler (caliph) resembles 
the role of the Prophet Muhammad as the leader 
of the umma (Hassan, 2006, p. 19). 
In order to accelerate its goal, HTI has been 
active in campaigning for sharia. It has proposed 
a legal draft for a sharia-based penal code. Ironi-
cally, however, HTI refuses to take part in any 
government initiative to discuss legal codes. HTI 
asserts that as long as the caliphate has not yet 
been established, it is useless to attempt such 
a task. The HTI leader of Yogyakarta branch, 
Muhammad Siddiq Al-Jawi, confirms that HTI 
has only been involved in the making of some 
academic drafts of sharia-based regional regula-
tions. It has never gone further than that process 
(Hassan, 2006, p. 19). HTI leaders carefully re-
mind Muslims of the dangers of the “democracy 
of the government, the president was forced to resign 
and the parliament was called off. Later on in 1992, FIS 
was banned and its leaders were arrested. See “Front 
Islamique du Salut”, http://i-cias.com/e.o/fis.htm. Simi-
larly, in the 1995 national legislative elections, Refah 
Party became the first religious party in Turkey to win 
a general election. Following its conflict with the army 
and other secular elements, it left power in 1997 and 
was subsequently banned. See Binnaz Toprak, “Religion 
and State in Turkey”, http://www.tau.ac.il/dayancenter/
mel/toprak.htm. 
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trap”, which they claim to be a “biological child 
of secularism” (Hassan, 2006, p. 19). HTI also 
organized a public conference (Tabligh Akbar), 
on 6 March 2005 in Bogor, a city where HTI has 
strong support, with the central theme of calling 
for the implementation of sharia. Interestingly, 
several regional governmental officers attended 
this congregation (Hassan, 2006, p. 20). 
Muslim scholars have different opinions 
regar ding HTI’s goal of restoring an Islamic 
caliphate. For instance, the rector of the State 
Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta 
(Universitas Islam Negeri/UIN), Azyumardi 
Azra argues that the contemporary resurgence 
of the idea of a single and universal caliphate 
is problematic (Azra, 2004, p. 136). Azra says 
that this idea is based on “historical and religious 
romanticism as well as misconceptions of not 
only the very meaning of the caliphate but also of 
the historical development of the caliphate itself 
in the period of the post-Prophet Muhammad” 
(2004, p. 136). He asserts that “supporters of the 
caliphate have confused and have failed to distin-
guish between the original and genuine caliphate 
during the “Rightly Guided Caliphs” (al-khulafa’ 
al-rashidun) and the despotic monarchies of the 
Umayyads, the Abbasids, and the Ottomans” 
(Azra, 2004, p. 136). The first two caliphs, Abu 
Bakar and Umar ibn al-Khattab, were elected on 
their qualities, whereas the succeeding caliphs, in 
the post-al-khulafa’al-rashidun period were basi-
cally kings (muluk) who had uncontested rights 
and privileges over other Muslims. Therefore, 
“modern thinkers of the caliphate such as Jamal 
al-Din al-Afghani, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, 
Rashid Ridha, Sayyid Qutb, and Abu al-A’la 
al-Mawdudi have all refused to recognize the 
credibility and legitimacy of those Muslim kings 
as caliphs” (Azra, 2004, p. 136).
These thinkers have different and even con-
flicting ideas on the basic concept of caliphate. 
Al-Kawakibi and Rida, on the one hand, assert 
that the caliph should be an Arab of the Quraysh 
tribe. Al-Mawdudi, on the other hand, strongly 
rejects this idea and insists that the caliph should 
be elected democratically from all Muslims and 
should exhibit qualities set by a special electing 
body called “ahl al-halli wa al-‘aqad” (Majlis 
al-Shura). Al-Mawdudi asserts that the exalted 
position of the caliph should not be set aside 
for an Arab since Arabs do not have exclusive 
privileges over other non-Arab Muslims (Azra, 
2004, p. 136). 
Azra goes on to criticize the idea of adopting 
sharia law in Indonesia as it would be “detri-
mental to the world’s most populous Muslim 
nation” (Peter, 2007). He goes on to argue that 
the implementation of sharia in Indonesia is cur-
rently illegal and that the nation’s supreme court 
must make this clear (Peter, 2007). Like Azra, 
the chairman of the Muhammadiyah (the Muslim 
mainstream organization), Din Syamsuddin, 
suggests that the caliphate discourse should not 
undermine the inclusivism and pluralism of the 
nation (Peter, 2007). He notes that non-Muslims 
should not be afraid of the discourse on the ca-
liphate as it was part of the democratic process 
(Peter, 2007). Effendy (2003, p. 7) also asserts 
that the idea of establishing an Islamic state in 
formal ideological terms is not significant. He 
believes that Islam is compatible with the secular 
system and what is important here is that the state 
guarantees the existence of Islam’s basic values.
In his observations on HTI’s publications, 
Fealy (2007, p. 163) has found that the material 
is largely aimed at a well-educated and urban 
audience. He has also found that the material 
leaves little room for an open-minded analysis. 
For instance, the depiction of the caliphal tradi-
tion in Islam builds on ahistorical arguments. In 
HTI’s texts, it is rare to find any reference to 
the limitations and failures of the caliphate as an 
institution, especially the role of the caliphate in 
relation to ensuring the political unity, stability 
and prosperity of the global umma. Fealy (2007, 
p. 163) criticizes the HTI literature as mostly 
developed from an idealized and romanticized 
perspective of the caliphate.
In response to these criticisms, HTI’s spokes-
man, Ismail Yusanto, has said that its view of 
the caliphate is not romanticism. He argues that 
the judgment of the Muslim scholar, Azyumardi 
Azra, that HTI was grieving over the downfall of 
the last Ottoman caliphate was inaccurate. Fol-
lowing the International Caliphate Conference 
2007, in Jakarta, he stated:
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“As a spokesman of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, I 
clarified time after time that this event was not 
meant to mourn and extend the sorrow of the 
fall of the Ottoman Caliphate since it was inap-
propriate to always mourn such a thing. Besides, 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia has never said that the 
caliphate to be established should be like the last 
Ottoman caliphate. Rather, it aims to be similar 
to ‘khilafah ‘ala minhaji an nubuwah’ (caliphate 
on the path of Prophethood) to take the example 
of the Prophet Muhammad (saw.) and which was 
then continued by the al-khulafa’al-rashidun 
(rightly-guided caliphs) who were the Prophet’s 
prominent companions” (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 
2007).
The important thing for HTI is that the 
reestablishment of the caliphate be an obligation 
felt by Muslims, and one not based only on the 
historical facts. HTI would prefer it to be ordered 
by God and His Prophet, that is, as a way to 
implement sharia and to represent the Muslim 
brotherhood (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 2007). 
However, this does not mean that historical facts 
are not important. Some lessons from history 
reveal that caliphates create problems, therefore 
the caliphate system which HTI proposes is one 
based on ideal used Islamic norms (Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia, 2007). Thus, although there were is-
sues with particular caliphs, this does not mean 
that the caliphate system itself is wrong, since it 
is inappropriate to blame the whole system by 
referring to the faults of some of the rulers. Those 
caliphs who turned away from ideal Islamic 
norms should not, according to HTI, be allowed 
to hide the historical fact of the golden era of the 
caliphate (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 2007). 
This fact has been documented by a number 
of historians, including Will Durant (1953), who 
wrote in his book, The Story of Civilizations, 
that for centuries the caliphate was successful in 
providing security and prosperity to a significant 
population over vast area9. Paul Kennedy (1987), 
in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Eco-
9 Reflecting on the historical records, in several centuries 
before 1500 AD, the Muslim world was more developed 
than Europe in the fields of culture and technology. It 
had great cities, educated peoples, and excellent used of 
resources. Indeed, some cities had qualified universities 
and complete libraries as well as beautiful mosques. 
The Muslims also led in the fields of mathematics, 
cartography, medicine, and other aspects of science and 
industries at that time, http://www.hizbut-tahrir.or.id/kki.
nomic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 
to 2000 wrote about the Ottoman caliphate as 
follows: “[the] Ottoman Empire was more than 
just a military machine. It had become an elite 
conqueror which was able to develop a unified 
faith, cultures, and language in greater areas 
than that of the Roman Empire and of greater 
population”. 
Looking back on the history of the spread 
of Islam in Indonesia, the Ottoman caliphate 
also played a significant role. The caliphate sent 
many Islamic preachers (ulama) including those 
called Walis (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 2007). The 
Ottoman also gave assistance to the Sultan of 
Aceh to fight against the Portuguese. Nurudin 
Ar Ranini (1966) in his book “Bustanus Salatin”, 
wrote that the Sultan of Aceh received military 
assistance including weaponry and instructors 
from the caliphate. 
In response to critics who claim that the 
establishment of a caliphate in Indonesia is 
unthinkable, HTI argues that it is unthinkable 
that Muslims will not struggle hard to achieve 
it. Uniting the umma is a huge and difficult task 
as well as the challenge, however, HTI believes 
that it is not a utopian dream. If an awareness 
corresponding to the vision and mission of state-
hood is given to the Muslim umma, it should not 
be impossible to realize such dream (Al-Jawi, 
2006). Due to the nature of Islamic propagation, 
which is aimed at all humanity (kaffatan li an-
nash) and is meant to give good virtues to the 
universe (rahmatan lil alamin), the unification of 
the Muslim umma is not deemed impossible. As 
leader of the HTI branch of Yogyakarta, Siddiq 
Al-Jawi has noted (2006) that historically, we 
have seen the establishment of the Soviet Union 
in 1917, predicated upon the Marxist ideology. 
History tells how after the Bolshevik revolution, 
the Soviet Union emerged and become one of 
the superpower in the world. Reflecting on these 
historical records, it is not impossible to imagine 
that there will be such a new society and a new 
state based on Islamic norms and ideals and 
which will likewise turn out to be a global power 
(Al-Jawi, 2006).
Despite all the conceptual and practical 
problems surrounding the idea of the caliphate 
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today, restoring the caliphate seems to have 
continually fascinated certain groups of Muslims 
throughout the world, including those in Indo-
nesia. HTI has grown rapidly in the past decade, 
both in terms of the size of its membership and 
the structure of its organization. Recently, HTI 
infiltrated rural areas and has gained significant 
influence in semi-government institutions such 
as the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majlis Ulama 
Indonesia/MUI). Despite this expansion, how-
ever, there is still skepticism about HTI among 
mainstream Muslims in Indonesia. The Hizbut 
Tahrir ideo logy appeals to certain elements of 
the Islamic community in Indonesia, however, it 
does not have wide resonance among the Muslim 
community there. The majority of Indonesian 
Muslims, as represented by mainstream organi-
zations such as the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and 
Muhammadiyah and by Muslim political parties, 
do not pay significant attention to this issue. This 
indicates that Indonesian mainstream Muslims 
are not interested much in the idea of restoring the 
caliphate, let alone in supporting its realization 
in Indonesia.
CONCLUSION
This study has shown through its analysis of 
debates between the idea of restoring an Islamic 
caliphate and the idea of the nation-state as the 
only legitimate political entity in Indonesia that 
these two perspectives are fundamentally incom-
patible. By analyzing the history and ideology of 
HTI, it was possible to explain the competition 
between nationalists (who promote and protect 
the secular system) and Islamists (who have a 
different conception of how the state should be). 
The analysis reveals that the tension between HTI 
and other elements of Indonesian society regard-
ing how the state should be ordered symbolizes 
the continuing competition between Islamists and 
nationalists. The Islamic caliphate which HTI 
strives for is an alternative global model of how 
to order world affairs. As such, it is incompati-
ble with the contemporary secular nation-state 
system.
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